CBAs truly do work!

The end of the doctors' strike comes as a relief for many Kenyans. The teachers' strike, and that of lecturers in public universities, ended when, in each case, the employer recognized and signed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into earlier. Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) needs to do the same.

But why did the industrial unrest in the public sector took so long to resolve? What led to the crisis in the first place? Could the strikes have been avoided?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand the trigger points for the industrial unrest in all the three cases. I will discuss four major catalysts, which I believe were significant contributors to the trigger points.   

The behavior of Parliament, of regularly awarding Members of Parliament (MPs) hefty salaries and allowances over time, is one catalyst that comes to mind. The most recent example was the appointment of the Akilano Akiwumi Tribunal by the 10^th Parliament in the year 2009. By awarding huge salaries and benefits to members of the 10^th Parliament, the Akilano Akiwumi Tribunal set the stage for the events that began to unfold toward the end of 2012. By early 2013, all the signs were there that the public sector was headed for a tumultuous phase.

As the end of the term of the 10^th Parliament approached, in 2012, the speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Kenneth Marende, was actively rooting for pay raise for the MPs. His reference to "job evaluation/description" as the basis for setting pay rates for the MPs, was informed by the activities of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC), which at this time was conducting a job evaluation exercise for State Officers. By August 2012, tenders to conduct job evaluation exercises for the entire public sector were out.

As one of numerous commissions created by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, the SRC was mandated to: a) “set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers; and b) advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers.”

Being an independent commission, it is most likely that the SRC's activities had the effect of watering down the principle of accountability when it came to matters of remuneration and benefits structuring for the public sector. I was expressing my concern about this development, when on August 20, 2012, I wondered whether management by "committees/commissions" (referred to as 'ostrich approach' to management), was going to work for Kenya.

The teachers' strike in 2011/2012, was triggered by the refusal of the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) - the employer – to honour a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of 1997. The fear that the CBA would soon expire, and be replaced with the SRC's new remuneration and benefits structures, made the situation untenable.

Evidently, the SRC's activities acted as strong catalyst for the industrial unrest trigger. The Commission's failure to come up with a fair, defensible system of remuneration and benefits structure for the public sector, led unionized public sector to pursue CBAs. As doctors and public universities lecturers decided to pursue CBAs that had stalled, invariably, the employers insisted on having the SRC's input before any agreement could be reached. This did not work. All it did was to prolong the agonizing process of getting back on to the CBA track.    

The third catalyst to the trigger point was the fear of what might happen to negotiated CBAs after devolving various services to the county governments. These fears were proved to be genuine as the country watched the hardline stance taken by the Council of Governors led by their chairman, the Meru County Governor, Peter Munya.

The fourth catalyst may be attributed to the results of job evaluation exercises, shoddily conducted across the public sector. Many of the resulting remuneration structures did not make sense. This was not surprising considering that the exercises were conducted using wrong methods, for the wrong purposes.

 It should be recalled that when the SRC began executing its mandate, the argument advanced was that the total wage bill in the public sector had steadily risen to unsustainable levels, and that there was urgent need to arrest the situation by scaling down the wage bill to manageable and sustainable levels.   

Unfortunately, by electing to use job evaluation exercises for setting pay levels for the public sector, the SRC took off on the wrong track. Clearly, job evaluations were designed for other purposes, the most important being removing or minimizing disparities in pay structures. The management of a "ballooning" wage bill required a different approach.

Indeed, during the Civil Service Reforms and re-structuring programs for the sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and '90s, job evaluation exercises were conducted across organizations, often in such a haphazard fashion, again, using inappropriate methods and approaches, that time and again, failure was the guaranteed outcome.

When the SRC invited consultants to submit expressions of interest to conduct job evaluation exercises for the entire public sector, I was dismayed by the way the terms of reference were drawn. More than anything else, these displayed complete lack of knowledge about what job evaluations were designed for, or what such exercises entailed. Just as in the 1980s/'90s, the terms of reference were seriously flawed.

In an unpublished article of August 28, 2012, I wrote: "The premise, on which the call for ‘expression of interest’ is based, is flawed. Organizations responding to the call, as stipulated in the terms of reference, should be excellent candidates for barring from ever undertaking job evaluation assignments".

Teachers must have sensed the coming changes as the landscape governing compensation structuring in the public sector was shifting unpredictably. Hence, their demand that the CBA entered into in 1997 be honored and executed.

The TSC had urged teachers to wait for the job evaluation by the SRC to be concluded, as it would provide the basis for any pay negotiations. Teachers disagreed and went on strike in 2012/'13, in 2014, and again in 2016 over the same issue. 

Were teachers, the doctors, and the public university lecturers, to expect the SRC to contribute in any meaningful way to the CBA negotiations, then they would have to wait a little while before that could happen. Their expectations could not possibly be met through reliance on job evaluation exercises.  

The four catalysts converged to create, directly or indirectly, the trigger for the strikes witnessed in the public sector. By abdicating their responsibility for accountability in managing and making decision on remuneration and benefits issues, the employers, skirted around these responsibilities, thus, triggering strikes that could easily have been avoided. By adopting an 'ostrich approach', the employers contributed their share of the "pain and suffering" endured by many Kenyans, as blame game was shifted around.  

The strikes came to an end. Progress was made by acknowledging and honouring the CBAs. But, is this the end of remuneration and benefits structuring problems in the public sector? It is doubtful! Still remaining unresolved, are serious disparities in remuneration and benefits structures in the public sector. Now would be the time for proper job evaluation exercises to be conducted. At the same time, answers to the "ballooning" wage bill will be needed. These are two different challenges. Can the SRC be depended upon to deliver on these challenges?