The salary scales for
magistrates and judges appeared in the media early in 2013. The then
Minister for Finance, Mr. Githae, alluded to, without elaborating, the apparent
disparities in the proposed pay structure.
In an unpublished
article of April 13, 2013, I made my own observations on the same as follows:
The basic salary scales
proposed by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) for magistrates and
judges, show differences between different grade levels, that are hard to
comprehend. The proposed basic salaries vary irregularly between successive job
grades. Clearly, a difference of thirteen percent (13%) between the lowest job
grade and the second lowest job grade; a difference of fifty-six percent (56%)
between job grade level 2 and level 3; eleven percent (11%) between level 3 and
level 4, and a difference of thirty-nine percent (39%) between level 4 and
level 5, cannot be explained. Such an irregular pattern in the pay structure
signifies a problem, either in the organizational structure, or inequalities in
the salary structure itself, or both.
A graphical representation
highlights these differences clearly. The graph is constructed using the data in
table 1, below, of the recommended base pay. In addition, a new row is
inserted to indicate what would be expected to be the maximum pay for each job
grade level.
Table 1: Judiciary
salary for levels 1 to 9 (from the lowest to the highest job grade)
The projected maximum
pay is inserted by assuming that a single factor could be used to determine the
range of pay for each job grade. In this case the highest job grade, level 9
(Chief Justice) is used as the reference point. The difference between the
minimum base pay for this grade, at KES 1 million, and the maximum pay at KES
1.3 million, is thirty percent (30%). Assuming that the same mark-up of 30% can
be applied to all the other job grade levels, we can obtain the maximum pay for
each job grade as shown in table 1. It is not uncommon to find business
organizations applying a 40% to 60% mark-up between the minimum and the maximum
pay for job grades at managerial and executive levels.
The pay rates for levels
6, 7 and 8 are not shown in the SRC’s pay structure. We can insert the values
by using extrapolation for the purpose of constructing Table 1. The salary
curves constructed from Table 1 data are shown below as Graph 1.
Graph 1: Salary Curves
for the Judiciary based on Table 1 data
From Series 1 (0 – 12)
on the Graph we can see grade levels 1 to 9(Resident Magistrate to Chief
Justice).
Series 2 line represents
the SRC’s proposed pay rates, and
Series 3 represents
possible maximum pay, which is set at 30% above the base pay rate for each
grade level.
As can be seen
from the graph, the series 1 curve highlights the irregularities in the base pay
rates for different job grades in the judiciary. The judgments and policy
decisions taken in arriving at the base pay may have contributed to this
anomaly. But more likely, the distortions are the result of superimposing the
results of a shoddy job evaluation exercise onto a bad salary structure.
The same information can
be used, depending on policy decisions, to construct a salary structure that
takes into consideration the concept of equity. An example of this is shown in
Graph 2, constructed using Table 2, which is a modified version of Table
1.
Table 2
Graph 2: Salary structure using SRC’s pay rates
after reducing
disparities
Series 1 represents the proposed
base pay, and
series 2, the maximum pay at 30%
mark-up
|
Although the resulting
salary curves are not perfectly smooth, at least most of the inequities in the
pay structure, shown in Graph 1, are removed. The remaining inequities can
easily be resolved by making the necessary pay adjustments.
The above are only
illustrations of how inequities in a pay structure may be highlighted. It is
important to note that, in many cases, it is the inequities in pay, whether
perceived, real or imagined, that are the source of dissatisfaction in
organizations rather than the actual pay per se. It is important to emphasize
that setting pay levels, and removing pay disparities in the resulting salary
structures are two distinctly different activities.
It is often the case,
that after the pay structure has been established through fiscal policy
decisions and judgments, inequities emerge in the pay structure. The effective
solution to eliminating such inequities is to conduct a thorough job analysis,
write job descriptions (usually job guides for senior level jobs), followed by
a job evaluation exercise. The success of such an exercise will often depend on
the expertise of the job analyst(s), the extent to which the key stakeholders
are involved in the process of conducting the exercise, and the preparedness of
the organization for the exercise. It is important to note that, a job
evaluation exercise must be conducted within the entity that wishes to
eliminate internal inequities in pay, and cannot be conducted across different
entities as the SRC has attempted doing for the public sector.
In conclusion, if what
is reflected by the pay structure and the salary curves for the magistrates and
judges in the judiciary is anything to go by, then the SRC has some homework
waiting to be done. Otherwise there will be murmurs over ‘inequities’ in pay.
But when all is done, the public sector, and by extension, the country as a
whole, will be the beneficiaries, and confidence in the Commission will be its reward.
Hopefully, the pay
structure for the judiciary has since been corrected - although I have my
doubts that this has been done. It is instructive to note a report appearing in the
media toward the end of 2016,, of a stand-off between the SRC and the Judicial Service Commission
(JSC) over the latter’s sitting allowances. And, I am
in full agreement with Ms. Anne Amadi – JSC Secretary – that the SRC has
overstepped (and has been overstepping) its mandate – indeed, perhaps in more than one area.
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