At your request

Dear Robert,

Thank you for contacting me about my last posting on my blog. As I promised you, here below are the three remuneration structures that were proposed for doctors in January and in March 2017. I have indicated the media source of the information.

I hope that the job analyst you mentioned can interpret for you what the graphs represent, in real terms, about the remuneration structures. You can contact me any time if you still have more questions on this issue.

I appreciate your interest in my contribution on the subject.

Sincerely,                                                                                                           

Daniel C. Macaria, DBA.

Robert,

I am sure your analyst will confirm to you that the salary curves are, indeed, 'horrifying'. 

While most welcome, good intentions may not be enough

Each one of them, came forward with good intentions. The doctors had been on strike for almost three months with no sign of an end in sight. So, they each came forward with good intentions to mediate between the employer, the striking doctors' union, and other stakeholders.

The well intentioned mediators included: lawyers representing the Law Society of Kenya, religious leaders, the human rights advocates, and the workers' union – Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) - leaders. Each group took its turn in the mediation efforts. In the end, the strike was ended by the intervention of the court. By recognizing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) as the logical, and the legal way forward with regard to the contentious remuneration structure, the court finally brought to an end one of the longest strikes by doctors in Kenya.

Rather than entangle myself in the merits and demerits of the events as they unraveled, I will "stick to my knitting" by confining my comments to systemic and technical challenges that the mediators were up against.

First, suffice it to say that the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) - an intruder in the process - had pushed the envelope far beyond its boundaries, thus creating confusion and unfavorable environment for any mediation efforts to succeed. By recommending an untenable, and a baseless remuneration structure for the medics, the SRC had introduced a new dimension that threatened to circumvent a logical approach to resolving the standoff. None of the mediators appeared knowledgeable enough about, or even considered, the SRC's delimitation in the matter.

Second, by adopting an ostrich approach, the employer had failed to take charge. By taking 'safe' refuge behind the SRC, the employer had abdicated his responsibility, and the accountability that went with it. This action had failed the doctors miserably. It was going to be a mammoth task to get the employer's head, out of the sand. The mediators had no technical gears to enable them to perform this onerous task successfully.

Third, the media were of little help. They didn't appear to be able to disseminate and report accurately and fairly what was happening all the time the strike was on. But they kept the public informed about the suffering that many patients, and those of kin, had to endure while the doctors were on strike. 

On January 11, 2017, the media published the remuneration structure proposed by the Ministry of Health, for the striking doctors. On March 7, 2017, a new structure appeared, followed by another revision on March 9, 2017. As the public consumed the new information, the hostility towards doctors increased. A perfect "GIGO" situation had developed and was beginning to manifest itself in the social media vitriol towards the doctors. 

The pace at which the successive remuneration structures were generated was impressive. What was unimpressive were the salary curves generated from the proposed remuneration structures - quite disheartening!

Being a smart lot, the doctors must have seen, or sensed that something was not right – perhaps, even terribly wrong – technically. The remuneration structures made little sense to, not just a competent job analyst, but even to a keen observer. The standoff continued.

On their part, the mediators were, without a doubt, clueless about the complex nature of structuring a sound remuneration system - one devoid of disparities and disputes. None of the mediators had the slightest chance of succeeding navigating through a totally flawed system.   

In the end, the courts saved the day by upholding the CBA, as the best option, under the circumstances. But, was this likely to be a lasting solution? Far from it. As long as professional advice continued to be spurned, as long as the public sector ignored advice to build capability in the relevant areas of organization development, as long as the wrong interventions were applied to the public sector's remuneration structures, and as long as distortions and disparities in remuneration structures persistently continued to be exhibited in the sector, there could be no guaranteed end to the instability and discontent within the sector.

Lastly, until the SRC quits pushing the envelope beyond its boundaries, and particularly into areas in which it has limited expertise, Kenyans will not have seen the last of the public sector's strike over pay.

Indeed, it will be a pleasant surprise if the year 2017 ends without new battle fronts being drawn over the implementation of some new pay structures. And yes, there will be people with good intentions, willing to step forward and mediate, but, unfortunately they will only be attempting to scratch on the surface of a deep institutional problem, whose inner core they can hardly ever reach – and perhaps not knowing that the surface they scratched, displayed only the symptoms, while the inner core carried the ailment that needed the healing. Yes, but tragically, so true.

CBAs truly do work!

The end of the doctors' strike comes as a relief for many Kenyans. The teachers' strike, and that of lecturers in public universities, ended when, in each case, the employer recognized and signed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into earlier. Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) needs to do the same.

But why did the industrial unrest in the public sector took so long to resolve? What led to the crisis in the first place? Could the strikes have been avoided?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand the trigger points for the industrial unrest in all the three cases. I will discuss four major catalysts, which I believe were significant contributors to the trigger points.   

The behavior of Parliament, of regularly awarding Members of Parliament (MPs) hefty salaries and allowances over time, is one catalyst that comes to mind. The most recent example was the appointment of the Akilano Akiwumi Tribunal by the 10^th Parliament in the year 2009. By awarding huge salaries and benefits to members of the 10^th Parliament, the Akilano Akiwumi Tribunal set the stage for the events that began to unfold toward the end of 2012. By early 2013, all the signs were there that the public sector was headed for a tumultuous phase.

As the end of the term of the 10^th Parliament approached, in 2012, the speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Kenneth Marende, was actively rooting for pay raise for the MPs. His reference to "job evaluation/description" as the basis for setting pay rates for the MPs, was informed by the activities of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC), which at this time was conducting a job evaluation exercise for State Officers. By August 2012, tenders to conduct job evaluation exercises for the entire public sector were out.

As one of numerous commissions created by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, the SRC was mandated to: a) “set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers; and b) advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers.”

Being an independent commission, it is most likely that the SRC's activities had the effect of watering down the principle of accountability when it came to matters of remuneration and benefits structuring for the public sector. I was expressing my concern about this development, when on August 20, 2012, I wondered whether management by "committees/commissions" (referred to as 'ostrich approach' to management), was going to work for Kenya.

The teachers' strike in 2011/2012, was triggered by the refusal of the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) - the employer – to honour a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of 1997. The fear that the CBA would soon expire, and be replaced with the SRC's new remuneration and benefits structures, made the situation untenable.

Evidently, the SRC's activities acted as strong catalyst for the industrial unrest trigger. The Commission's failure to come up with a fair, defensible system of remuneration and benefits structure for the public sector, led unionized public sector to pursue CBAs. As doctors and public universities lecturers decided to pursue CBAs that had stalled, invariably, the employers insisted on having the SRC's input before any agreement could be reached. This did not work. All it did was to prolong the agonizing process of getting back on to the CBA track.    

The third catalyst to the trigger point was the fear of what might happen to negotiated CBAs after devolving various services to the county governments. These fears were proved to be genuine as the country watched the hardline stance taken by the Council of Governors led by their chairman, the Meru County Governor, Peter Munya.

The fourth catalyst may be attributed to the results of job evaluation exercises, shoddily conducted across the public sector. Many of the resulting remuneration structures did not make sense. This was not surprising considering that the exercises were conducted using wrong methods, for the wrong purposes.

 It should be recalled that when the SRC began executing its mandate, the argument advanced was that the total wage bill in the public sector had steadily risen to unsustainable levels, and that there was urgent need to arrest the situation by scaling down the wage bill to manageable and sustainable levels.   

Unfortunately, by electing to use job evaluation exercises for setting pay levels for the public sector, the SRC took off on the wrong track. Clearly, job evaluations were designed for other purposes, the most important being removing or minimizing disparities in pay structures. The management of a "ballooning" wage bill required a different approach.

Indeed, during the Civil Service Reforms and re-structuring programs for the sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and '90s, job evaluation exercises were conducted across organizations, often in such a haphazard fashion, again, using inappropriate methods and approaches, that time and again, failure was the guaranteed outcome.

When the SRC invited consultants to submit expressions of interest to conduct job evaluation exercises for the entire public sector, I was dismayed by the way the terms of reference were drawn. More than anything else, these displayed complete lack of knowledge about what job evaluations were designed for, or what such exercises entailed. Just as in the 1980s/'90s, the terms of reference were seriously flawed.

In an unpublished article of August 28, 2012, I wrote: "The premise, on which the call for ‘expression of interest’ is based, is flawed. Organizations responding to the call, as stipulated in the terms of reference, should be excellent candidates for barring from ever undertaking job evaluation assignments".

Teachers must have sensed the coming changes as the landscape governing compensation structuring in the public sector was shifting unpredictably. Hence, their demand that the CBA entered into in 1997 be honored and executed.

The TSC had urged teachers to wait for the job evaluation by the SRC to be concluded, as it would provide the basis for any pay negotiations. Teachers disagreed and went on strike in 2012/'13, in 2014, and again in 2016 over the same issue. 

Were teachers, the doctors, and the public university lecturers, to expect the SRC to contribute in any meaningful way to the CBA negotiations, then they would have to wait a little while before that could happen. Their expectations could not possibly be met through reliance on job evaluation exercises.  

The four catalysts converged to create, directly or indirectly, the trigger for the strikes witnessed in the public sector. By abdicating their responsibility for accountability in managing and making decision on remuneration and benefits issues, the employers, skirted around these responsibilities, thus, triggering strikes that could easily have been avoided. By adopting an 'ostrich approach', the employers contributed their share of the "pain and suffering" endured by many Kenyans, as blame game was shifted around.  

The strikes came to an end. Progress was made by acknowledging and honouring the CBAs. But, is this the end of remuneration and benefits structuring problems in the public sector? It is doubtful! Still remaining unresolved, are serious disparities in remuneration and benefits structures in the public sector. Now would be the time for proper job evaluation exercises to be conducted. At the same time, answers to the "ballooning" wage bill will be needed. These are two different challenges. Can the SRC be depended upon to deliver on these challenges? 

PriceWaterhouse needs to come clean on this one

On February 17, 2014, an article in the local media suggested that, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) was proposing "major changes in remuneration of state and public officials", after a job evaluation exercise conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for all State Officers. This was long before a job evaluation exercise for the Public officers had been concluded. In the article, titled: “President to top pay list under new rules”, the author proceeded to suggest that PwC had conducted the job evaluation exercise "for all State Officers" using "the USA and South Africa for comparative bench-marking."     

I was skeptical about the facts in the article, and on February 20, 2014, I made the following comments:

It is not clear whether the writer is referring to a different remuneration structure from the one that appeared in Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV - No 33 of March 1, 2013, showing the new structure for the State Officers. What is surprising though, is the idea that PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) conducted a job evaluation for all the State Offices using “the USA and South Africa for comparative bench-marking”.  I doubt that PwC would do that; since doing so would be tantamount to taking the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and Kenyans at large, for a ride!

Clearly, international pay comparisons would be useful only for indexing purposes. In this case, the idea would be to compare countries with close, or similar economies, or characteristics, depending on the parameters being compared.

The article also indicated that the job evaluation had resulted in "creating 112 State Offices up from 50". The author did not clarify whether the additional State Offices were new jobs, or new positions – (a job can have several positions). My concern was that the author of the article was wrong on facts.

It is important that PwC clarifies whether the firm did in fact conduct a job evaluation exercise, and the method(s) used, for the reasons I have given here:

·       An indexing exercise cannot be construed to be job evaluation.

·       The contents of Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV – No 33 of March 1, 2013, did not reflect results of a job evaluation.

·       State Officers' jobs were spread across three arms of the government, and also across the counties and the National Assembly. The counties and the National Assembly were yet to be established when the exercise was purported to have been conducted.

·       Even if we were to assume that PwC did conduct a job evaluation exercise, then, a single exercise could not have been applicable across different entities as the published results appeared to indicate.

The fact that PwC has to-date not refuted the author's claims, the onus is on the firm to come out clean on this.   

As early as January 11, 2013, I was questioning the validity of the job evaluation being conducted across different entities when I made the following observation:  

The ongoing job evaluation exercise for the State Officers’ jobs may be difficult to justify, since a State Officer’s job can be evaluated only within the entity it belongs in. It should be obvious to any competent job analyst that psychometric measurements, such as job evaluations, can be conducted only within the parameters of the system being subjected to such measurements, and not across two or more other systems. The premise on which the current exercise is based cannot be justified. 

The question remains: If PwC did conduct a job evaluation exercise in 2012/'13, for the State Officers, what method(s) did the firm use?

An open letter to SRC

Dear SRC Commissioners,

When you published the salary scales for the State Officers' jobs in a special issue of the Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, it was quite clear to me that you were off track on your mandate of setting compensation and benefits for the State Officers' jobs. To make matters worse, you had based your published document on a job evaluation exercise that never occurred, in real sense. After several suggestions, that went unacknowledged, I felt that the SRC's mandate was too pervasive to be ignored. And I felt the need to register my personal assessment of the situation by writing to a third party – Parliament.

On May 22, 2013, I wrote to Parliament expressing my reservations about the results of the job evaluation exercise that supposedly had been conducted for the State Officers' jobs, and expressed the view that the SRC ‘s actions, if ignored, were likely to adversely affect the entire public sector. In my letter, I noted:

1.)    The Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) claims that the published salaries are based on the result of a job evaluation exercise. My reservations about this claim arises from the fact that:

·        A job evaluation exercise must have the participation of all the stakeholders

·        A job evaluation exercise cannot be carried out across different entities. It follows then that a job evaluation exercise could not have been carried out across the legislature, the judiciary and the executive offices under one system

·     The factor comparison method, supposedly used by the SRC, is not meant for managerial and executive jobs. It is designed for factory and operatives' jobs

·        The salary curves generated from salaries announced in the special issue of Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, do not conform to results of a job evaluation. Pay progressions, for instance, reflect simple arithmetic progressions that are not even consistent.

·        A psychometric measurement, such as a job evaluation, should reflect a geometric progression pattern from one job grade to the next. 

·       County Offices are a new creation and, therefore, the salaries and remuneration packages for officers occupying the new roles in the counties should have been established first on the basis of the employer’s fiscal policies, including policies on compensation and benefits. Furthermore, at this level, the SRC’s role should have been advisory only. In any event, a job evaluation exercise could not have been conducted for non-existing jobs in the counties.

·        The internal inequities reflected in the salary structures, for instance, for the judiciary, could not be explained by a job evaluation exercise.

2.)    The assumption that the SRC can indeed, execute its wide mandate professionally, fairly, and equitably, should be subjected to scrutiny so as to confirm, modify, or reject this assumption.

3.)    Increasingly, organizations have become complex and workplaces difficult to compare or draw parallelisms between them. The complexity increases with the dissimilarities of the entities being considered, particularly where the entities may have little in common in terms of strategies and operational objectives. Yet, this is what the SRC proposes, or intends to do with the state institutions/corporations in Kenya for the purpose of salaries and remuneration structuring. This does not, and will not work.

4.)   State institutions/corporations in Kenya include those that are in business, education and research, services that have high economic and social impacts, environmental management, and agricultural fields, among many others. Classifying such an array of institutions under a single system for the purpose of making decisions on salaries and remuneration is untenable, inaccurate, and indefensible.

5.)    Failure to follow the rules of the game in setting up salaries and remuneration structures for the public sector could easily lead to disruptive practices in a demoralized public sector.  Clearly, despite the SRC’s public relations efforts, the hype in the media, and the public outcry over the MPs’ reaction to the SRC’s salaries and remuneration structures, it is only the Parliament that has the means, and the ability to scrutinize the way the independent commissions go about executing their respective mandates.

Obviously, Parliament has its own limitations. One, because of the independent nature of the constitutional commissions; two, because of the lack of technical know-how in this areas; and three, Parliament has been a big beneficiary of a flawed remuneration and benefits system, and it is unlikely that 'rocking the boat' - as the saying goes - would be in the institution's interest.

This notwithstanding, when I wrote to Parliament in 2013, I suggested that the National Assembly could consider sponsoring a small select group of Members for a one-day workshop on the key issues that are central to salaries and remuneration structuring. This would provide the opportunity for the delegates to review, analyze, and share information that would give the delegates a common understanding of the issues involved. This understanding would be essential for constructive engagement with the SRC on matters of salary and remuneration structuring, in the event that the intervention of Parliament was necessary. (Incidentally, we have started seeing the National Assembly getting involved in the public sector's remuneration issues.)  

But, when all is said and done, one thing that remains clear in my mind is that, the SRC is here to stay. It is also clear in my mind that the investment in time and resources, in addition to the human emotions injected to such a project as compensation structuring, can easily lead one to becoming a willing captive of the project, even when it is evident that the path taken may not be as smooth, and as clear as one had hoped. The ability to pause, read the signs and change course, can mean the difference between success and failure.

I would strongly urge the SRC to pause and read the signs. This will allow the Commission to take a decision on whether to let go off the 'tail of the wage bill beast', and hold the 'beast by its horns'! There are no two ways around this. And, by getting back on the right course, the SRC would be doing one great service to our Nation.

In which case, four things need to happen:

1)   Get back to the basics (as I have often urged you to) and establish the best platform on which to build internal capability in both remuneration structuring and job evaluation techniques for the public sector,

2)  Establish a collaborative method of setting and regulating compensation and benefits for the State Officers' jobs, as mandated by the Constitution.

3)  Establish a collaborative way of assisting the public sector in setting up a viable and a manageable remuneration structure

4)  Advise on ways of establishing credible and defensible methods of removing disparities in compensation structures.

Most of what is required in order to achieve the above four objectives, I have already shared with the SRC, the PSC, and other relevant Ministries.

It is necessary to note that, the above suggestions are similar to suggestions I have made in the past. In 2004/'05, for instance, when the first job evaluation exercise was conducted for the Civil Service, it was clear that wrong methods were adopted for the job.  The government had neither the requisite internal know-how to detect this, nor the capability to assess the acceptability of the method being used. It was clear to me then, that there was need to build capability in job evaluation and compensation structuring within the government. This would give the government the capacity to monitor and assess consultancy services being provided in this area.

In my letter of November 22, 2004 to Ambassador Francis Muthaura, (the then Permanent Secretary, Secretary to The Cabinet and Head of the Public Service) I suggested the following, among other things:

“It is unlikely, … that the current Point Rating system being used for the Civil Service job evaluation exercise will produce results that can be implemented.”

I proceeded to offer a free presentation on various systems of job evaluations and how to select, apply, and implement the most appropriate ones. Credit to Ambassador Muthaura’s office, I received a response on January 3, 2005, which read:

“Thank you for your letter regarding the above subject matter. Delay in replying is regretted.

Kindly note that your proposal has been forwarded to Directorate of Personnel Management for consideration. They have separately been advised to get in touch with you regarding the presentation.”  

This response came after it had become quite clear that the job evaluation exercise, that was still in progress, was not going as well as had been expected. Unfortunately, I could not follow up on this as the letter reached me just a few days before I was due to travel out of the country for an extended stay, to organize my research in preparation for my doctoral dissertation defense.  

Again, in August 2010 I wrote to Ambassador Muthaura, this time in reference to the Akilano Akiwumi tribunal’s work on compensation and benefits for Members of Parliament and the employees of the National Assembly. Following are the contents of that letter:

Remuneration structuring and compensation administration in public and constitutional institutions can be done professionally and competently if specific steps are taken to ensure that the necessary skills are developed within the relevant government ministry or department. DPM might be just the right place to launch such a developmental programme, thus bringing professionalism into the elusive area of job evaluation and compensation structuring.

It is fair to note, for instance, that the Akilano Akiwumi tribunal lacked the benefit of professional input when reviewing the remuneration packages for Members of Parliament and the employees of the National Assembly. While acknowledging the importance of the task that lay before such a tribunal, (or as may come before a commission such as the one proposed for the future), it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the outcome of such an important exercise as remuneration structuring, might amount to nothing more than a ‘bandaging' response to a festering wound requiring a ‘surgical’ approach.

My recommendation when I appeared before the tribunal on April 3, 2009, was for the tribunal to take a long-term view and advise the government on the need to develop professional capability with the capacity to address issues of salaries administration and compensation structuring within the public and constitutional institutions.

The potential to build a cadre of professionals in this area, I noted, was high. And the Directorate of Personnel Management was one place to look for possible candidates.

My suggestion was similar to a proposal I had made earlier, in 2004, when a job evaluation exercise was underway for the Civil Service. My proposal then was to assist DPM in acquiring skills that would enable the government to monitor and evaluate the on-going exercise, so that its successful implementation might be realized.

I still do believe that the requisite capability can be developed within DPM, so that professional input is always readily available whenever the need to review remuneration structures arises, either in the public sector in general, or in constitutional institutions. Furthermore, it would help maintain, monitor and manage the installed remuneration structures. 

In conclusion I should add that, without the existence of a logical framework within which the administration of remuneration can be carried out, it will always remain a challenge to remove, or even minimize inequalities in a remuneration system, be it in the public or in the private sector of our economy.

Indeed, without professional input, a commission such as the one to be constituted may not have the tools to enable it to fairly, and adequately, address compensation issues in what is bound to be an increasingly complex work place with ever changing needs for new skill-sets.

I strongly believe that there is an urgent need for the government, in this case, the employer, in collaboration with the SRC, to consider building the necessary know-how in compensation structuring and job evaluation practices, as a high priority. Without the requisite internal know-how for the public sector, we can expect huge sums of the taxpayers' money to be squandered on projects that cannot be implemented. 

CBA - The just option for the public sector

It has been a real challenge for the public sector to wade through the murky waters of remunerations and benefits through CBAs. To complicate matters, the arbitration processes have been thrown into disarray by the entry of the SRC into the equation, with little to offer. Furthermore, the negotiations have been conducted largely without the input from industrial relations experts, or other experts in the trade.

The courts have also had their share of challenges, leaving the ordinary Kenyan a little confused. Three different court decisions, reported in the media recently, attest to this.

In the first case, where the challenge was on the constitutionality of Parliament in nullifying "certain gazette notices issued by the SRC, in respect of earnings by public servants", a three-judge bench ruled that the SRC had acted within the law, and Parliament needed to be "alive to the objects and authority of commissions and independent offices (as) provided by the law." 

In a second case, a high court Judge ruled that: "unions whose members worked in state corporations should know their members are public servants and the SRC was constitutionally empowered to regulate their salaries." This, notwithstanding the fact that the SRC was empowered by law to: “set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers", but, to "advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers.”

Yet, in a third case, on November 27, 2014, another high court judge made a ruling, that the SRC had "no powers to determine the salaries and benefits of parastatal workers." The Judge further observed that, "the SRC could not meddle in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that employees of state corporations have signed with their employers".

I stand to be corrected here, I don't believe that the teachers, doctors, professors and the lecturers in public institutions, all fall under the State Officers classification. But, as a job analyst, I will stick to what I am best qualified to comment on.

In the year 2012, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) invited consultants to submit expressions of interest (EOI) to conduct job evaluation exercises for two job classifications in the public sector. The exercise for the first job category, was to evaluate all the jobs classified as State Officers. The deadline for submitting expressions of interest for this category was June 4, 2012.

The other exercise, was for “all Public Offices (excluding State Offices) in the national and county governments.” And to “include all jobs in, but not limited to: Civil Service; Teaching Service; National Security organs; over two hundred State Corporations; the Judicial Service; the Kenya National Assembly; Kenya National Audit Office; Controller of Budget Office; Office of Director of Public Prosecution; Constitutional Commissions; Statutory Committees/Commissions/Tribunals and Public Universities.” The deadline for submitting expressions of interest for this category, was August 24, 2012.

 Something, unexplained, must have happened to the second exercise, because, two years later, in August 2014, the SRC sent out a fresh invitation for consultants to submit expression of interest to conduct a job evaluation exercise for public officers. This time the exercise was to “cover all jobs in public offices, both at the national and county governments including other public institutions within the public service.” But, this time, the SRC had “clustered the organizations into seven (7) broad clusters/sectors”

Unfortunately, by embarking on job evaluation exercises, which the SRC was to use as the baseline for setting compensation levels for the State and Public Offices, the Commission committed the first error of choosing the wrong platform for the job. The Commission should have instead, realized that setting pay levels, was a matter of economic considerations, the prevailing community pay levels, the employer’s fiscal policies, and the employer’s ability to implement and sustain a manageable compensation structure. Job evaluation exercises were designed for different purposes. The most important among them being to minimize or remove inequalities in a pay structure. This process would usually be initiated by the organization that elects to do it.

Even if we were to assume that a job evaluation exercise could be used to determine the basic pay in an organization - something it is not designed to do – there are some rudimentary rules that should be observed to ensure that such an exercise was meaningful. For instance, the affected organization, as the key stakeholder, should be fully prepared for participation in such an exercise. The preparation process would require:

1)     Internal briefings and forming a job evaluation team (job evaluation committee) under a qualified job analyst – often an external consultant

2)     Identifying the range of jobs to be included in the exercise

3)     Selecting an appropriate job evaluation method

4)     Training the job evaluation committee. The members of the committee should be drawn from across functions, and should comprise people who clearly understand the jobs in the organization.

5)     Collecting information about the jobs to be evaluated, analyzing the jobs and preparing jobs descriptions. The job descriptions so prepared provide the main source of information for the steps that follow in conducting the exercise.

Ignoring the above rules, will, invariably, lead to generating expensive reports that are of little value to the organization. I am afraid to say that, this is the state of affairs in which the public sector in Kenya, finds itself, right now.

It should be remembered that, right at the outset, the SRC was very concerned about the size of the wage bill for the public sector. On August 14, 2012, I sent an email to the Commission suggesting that, the wage bill in the public sector could be brought to manageable and sustainable levels within a span of five to eight years, if the right approach was adopted. I suggested the following as an appropriate approach:

                 i.          Examine the current distribution of remuneration packages (total wage bill) across the public sector, and in collaboration with Treasury and other stakeholders, determine levels at which the wage bill could be sustained. This should enable the Commission to determine whether a ‘living wage’ (as has been done in some countries) could be used as a basis for setting the minimum pay in the public sector. This would provide the Commission with the necessary baseline for calibrating the remuneration and benefits structure for the public sector.

               ii.          Get all the stakeholders on board, as policy guidelines on salaries were agreed on, in line with the assessed level of a sustainable wage bill. (This is the stage where the CBAs become crucial).

             iii.          Commission an exercise on jobs rationalization (the need and the purpose for every job), and a job audit exercise, where necessary, to ensure that the wage bill was for actual, existing, and necessary jobs- (i.e. remove ghost workers from the payroll, and eliminate unnecessary jobs).

             iv.          With the help of compensation/salary structuring experts, set initial minimum and maximum compensation/salary levels for each of the entities identified in the terms of reference (in the call for EOI).

               v.          Incorporate in the process, provisions for the forty-seven counties and deal with these after the counties are fully constituted, functioning, and rationalized.  

             vi.          Job evaluation exercises could then follow, as deemed necessary, for each entity in the public sector, in order to remove, or minimize disparities in the compensation structures.

It was going to be a costly error for the SRC to start setting compensation structures through job evaluation exercises. An offer to make a free presentation on compensation structuring and job evaluation practices was not taken.

To my mind, the SRC ‘s mandate was too pervasive to be ignored. There was an urgent need to ensure that issues of remuneration and benefits for the State and Public Officers were approached correctly, since any adverse impact would affect the entire public sector, and, at a very high cost. My thought was to approach Parliament with the idea of offering a one-day workshop for a select number of people. But, again, "one does not have to attend some workshop to understand some things!", was what I heard coming out of Parliament.  

Already, by the beginning of 2013, there were signs that all was not going well. The claim by the SRC that the salaries announced in a special issue of the Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, were based on a job evaluation exercise results, was inaccurate. I pointed out the same to the SRC giving the following reasons:

·       A job evaluation exercise must have full participation of all the stakeholders. Both the National Assembly and the County Governments were not constituted at the time when the exercise was supposed to have been conducted.

·       A job evaluation exercise cannot be carried out across different entities. It follows then that a job evaluation exercise could not have been carried out across the legislature, the judiciary and the executive offices under one system, as reflected in the published results.

·       The factor comparison method, supposedly used by the SRC, was never designed for managerial and executive jobs. It was designed for operative and factory jobs

·       The salary curves generated from salaries announced in the special issue of the Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, did not conform to results of a job evaluation. As a psychometric measurement, a graphical representation of a job evaluation results, should follow a geometric progression, according to Weber's law. 

In a one-way communication with SRC, I noted that:

Increasingly, organizations have become complex and workplaces difficult to compare or draw parallelisms between them. The complexity increases with the dissimilarities in different entities, particularly where the entities may have little in common in terms of strategies and operational objectives. It is, therefore, not possible to conduct one job evaluation exercise across such entities. Yet, this is what the SRC has attempted to do, and proposes, or intends to continue doing with the state institutions/corporations in Kenya, for purposes of remuneration and benefits structuring. 

Furthermore, state institutions/corporations in Kenya include those that are in business, education and research; others are in services that have high economic and social impacts; yet, there are others that are engaged in environmental management, and agricultural enterprises, all these, among many others, have each, their unique systems of operation. Classifying such an array of institutions in clusters for the purpose of making decisions on remuneration and benefits is untenable and indefensible.

Failure to follow the 'rules of the game', in setting remuneration and benefits for the public sector, could easily lead to disruptive actions in a demoralized public sector.

Finally, I am using the information, which appeared in the media recently, to drawn graphical representations of the remuneration structures for Parliament, the Judiciary, and for the Doctors. Among the three data sets selected, only the Doctors' remuneration structure shows both minimum and maximum pay for each job group.

I will make only passing comment on the other two that don't show complete story. And then attempt to analyze the remuneration structure for Doctors, to illustrate the points I have tried to make here.

The data source for the graphs – here below - is from the remuneration structures published on February 7, 2017, by The Standard. Although several of the data published had numerous errors, the three data sets will provide adequate illustration.

The first thing that is noticeable is that the percentage differences between successive grades are all erratic. The salary curves themselves are difficult to describe. For a job analyst, they simply appear CHAOTIC! There is no job evaluation system that can explain the graphs. My analysis will be focused on the compensation structures for the Doctors' jobs.

PARLIAMENT

JUDICIARY

Doctors:

As the salary curves for the doctors’ monthly income indicate, here below, something is seriously wrong. Even if one were to accept that a job evaluation exercise could be conducted for the purpose of setting pay levels in an organization – something it is not designed to do – still, it would be prudent to use acceptable systems, and rules. Otherwise it would be double tragedy to superimpose the results derived from a faulty system onto an already defective compensation structure. And this is precisely what the SRC has attempted to do in this case and for the whole of the public sector.

Now, when a job analyst is presented with the above information, the first assumption is that the information represents the current status of the organization under study. The curve for the minimum pay should provide the basis from which to investigate the fairness of the compensation structure.

 We can see that there are eight (8)  job groups for Doctors. The lowest earns KES 196,989.00, while the highest earns KES 472,060.00 per month. We know that disparities exist in the structure just by looking at the percentage differences in basic pay between successive grades. One way of removing the disparities in the pay structure would be to find the common ratio for a geometric series between the minimum pay, for job group L and the minimum pay for job group T. The equation for the geometric series in this case is:

         
    
   Where the last term in the equation is KES 472,060, and the first term (a) is KES 196,989, where r is the common ratio. By solving the equation for r, we get 1.13 as the common ratio for the geometric progression. The equation for this calculation is:

    We can now use this factor (1.13) to obtain the values lying between job group L and job group T, i.e. values between the first term and the last term of the series. The new set of values, and the resulting graph, represent a more equitable compensation structure. The final structure would depend on the acceptability of the current pay structure, or on an existing CBA, and/or a job evaluation exercise, if this is deemed to be necessary.

It is important to underline the importance of involving all the stakeholders in a job evaluation exercise, as would be the case for CBA. Failure to meet this condition removes the ownership of the process from the stakeholders.

           
Doctors

       

The salary curves would look different if the compensation structure was designed to incorporate pay for performance. In this case the salary curves would be three, with the middle curve representing, an acceptable, average performance level. This decision varies from organization to organization, and the organization's competences in managing performance for productivity rather than for punitive purposes.

In conclusion, it is important to note that, the public sector will have to built adequate internal capacity in compensation structuring and job evaluation methods, if the sector expects to succeed in the elusive area of job evaluations and compensation management.

For now, the SRC needs to get back on track and put its house in order. In the meantime, the public sector has few options open outside the CBAs, for getting just and fair compensation structures.

Footnote

Thankfully, the Doctors are out of jail. After all, “The law is an ass”.

There are still lessons to be learnt from Oliver Twist (1838), by Charles Dickens. "Mr. Bumble, the unhappy spouse of a domineering wife, is told in court that ‘…the law supposes that your wife acts under your direction." Mr. Bumble does not understand how the law can possibly hold him accountable for any crime committed by his wife. Yet, the law holds him responsible!  

"If the law supposes that,’ said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands, ‘the law is a ass - a idiot".

Indeed, who would have expected to see a stand-off between the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC)? Yet, the law permitted it. In this case, was, or, wasn't, the SRC overstepping its mandate in encroaching on matters that did not concern it? Nevertheless, the protagonists had to make their arguments in a court of law to get a ruling on whether the SRC could 'meddle' with the sitting allowances for the members of the JSC. Well, "the law is an ass". Whichever way the ruling, it must be obeyed! Again, wading through murky waters!