An open letter to SRC

Dear SRC Commissioners,

When you published the salary scales for the State Officers' jobs in a special issue of the Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, it was quite clear to me that you were off track on your mandate of setting compensation and benefits for the State Officers' jobs. To make matters worse, you had based your published document on a job evaluation exercise that never occurred, in real sense. After several suggestions, that went unacknowledged, I felt that the SRC's mandate was too pervasive to be ignored. And I felt the need to register my personal assessment of the situation by writing to a third party – Parliament.

On May 22, 2013, I wrote to Parliament expressing my reservations about the results of the job evaluation exercise that supposedly had been conducted for the State Officers' jobs, and expressed the view that the SRC ‘s actions, if ignored, were likely to adversely affect the entire public sector. In my letter, I noted:

1.)    The Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) claims that the published salaries are based on the result of a job evaluation exercise. My reservations about this claim arises from the fact that:

·        A job evaluation exercise must have the participation of all the stakeholders

·        A job evaluation exercise cannot be carried out across different entities. It follows then that a job evaluation exercise could not have been carried out across the legislature, the judiciary and the executive offices under one system

·     The factor comparison method, supposedly used by the SRC, is not meant for managerial and executive jobs. It is designed for factory and operatives' jobs

·        The salary curves generated from salaries announced in the special issue of Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, do not conform to results of a job evaluation. Pay progressions, for instance, reflect simple arithmetic progressions that are not even consistent.

·        A psychometric measurement, such as a job evaluation, should reflect a geometric progression pattern from one job grade to the next. 

·       County Offices are a new creation and, therefore, the salaries and remuneration packages for officers occupying the new roles in the counties should have been established first on the basis of the employer’s fiscal policies, including policies on compensation and benefits. Furthermore, at this level, the SRC’s role should have been advisory only. In any event, a job evaluation exercise could not have been conducted for non-existing jobs in the counties.

·        The internal inequities reflected in the salary structures, for instance, for the judiciary, could not be explained by a job evaluation exercise.

2.)    The assumption that the SRC can indeed, execute its wide mandate professionally, fairly, and equitably, should be subjected to scrutiny so as to confirm, modify, or reject this assumption.

3.)    Increasingly, organizations have become complex and workplaces difficult to compare or draw parallelisms between them. The complexity increases with the dissimilarities of the entities being considered, particularly where the entities may have little in common in terms of strategies and operational objectives. Yet, this is what the SRC proposes, or intends to do with the state institutions/corporations in Kenya for the purpose of salaries and remuneration structuring. This does not, and will not work.

4.)   State institutions/corporations in Kenya include those that are in business, education and research, services that have high economic and social impacts, environmental management, and agricultural fields, among many others. Classifying such an array of institutions under a single system for the purpose of making decisions on salaries and remuneration is untenable, inaccurate, and indefensible.

5.)    Failure to follow the rules of the game in setting up salaries and remuneration structures for the public sector could easily lead to disruptive practices in a demoralized public sector.  Clearly, despite the SRC’s public relations efforts, the hype in the media, and the public outcry over the MPs’ reaction to the SRC’s salaries and remuneration structures, it is only the Parliament that has the means, and the ability to scrutinize the way the independent commissions go about executing their respective mandates.

Obviously, Parliament has its own limitations. One, because of the independent nature of the constitutional commissions; two, because of the lack of technical know-how in this areas; and three, Parliament has been a big beneficiary of a flawed remuneration and benefits system, and it is unlikely that 'rocking the boat' - as the saying goes - would be in the institution's interest.

This notwithstanding, when I wrote to Parliament in 2013, I suggested that the National Assembly could consider sponsoring a small select group of Members for a one-day workshop on the key issues that are central to salaries and remuneration structuring. This would provide the opportunity for the delegates to review, analyze, and share information that would give the delegates a common understanding of the issues involved. This understanding would be essential for constructive engagement with the SRC on matters of salary and remuneration structuring, in the event that the intervention of Parliament was necessary. (Incidentally, we have started seeing the National Assembly getting involved in the public sector's remuneration issues.)  

But, when all is said and done, one thing that remains clear in my mind is that, the SRC is here to stay. It is also clear in my mind that the investment in time and resources, in addition to the human emotions injected to such a project as compensation structuring, can easily lead one to becoming a willing captive of the project, even when it is evident that the path taken may not be as smooth, and as clear as one had hoped. The ability to pause, read the signs and change course, can mean the difference between success and failure.

I would strongly urge the SRC to pause and read the signs. This will allow the Commission to take a decision on whether to let go off the 'tail of the wage bill beast', and hold the 'beast by its horns'! There are no two ways around this. And, by getting back on the right course, the SRC would be doing one great service to our Nation.

In which case, four things need to happen:

1)   Get back to the basics (as I have often urged you to) and establish the best platform on which to build internal capability in both remuneration structuring and job evaluation techniques for the public sector,

2)  Establish a collaborative method of setting and regulating compensation and benefits for the State Officers' jobs, as mandated by the Constitution.

3)  Establish a collaborative way of assisting the public sector in setting up a viable and a manageable remuneration structure

4)  Advise on ways of establishing credible and defensible methods of removing disparities in compensation structures.

Most of what is required in order to achieve the above four objectives, I have already shared with the SRC, the PSC, and other relevant Ministries.

It is necessary to note that, the above suggestions are similar to suggestions I have made in the past. In 2004/'05, for instance, when the first job evaluation exercise was conducted for the Civil Service, it was clear that wrong methods were adopted for the job.  The government had neither the requisite internal know-how to detect this, nor the capability to assess the acceptability of the method being used. It was clear to me then, that there was need to build capability in job evaluation and compensation structuring within the government. This would give the government the capacity to monitor and assess consultancy services being provided in this area.

In my letter of November 22, 2004 to Ambassador Francis Muthaura, (the then Permanent Secretary, Secretary to The Cabinet and Head of the Public Service) I suggested the following, among other things:

“It is unlikely, … that the current Point Rating system being used for the Civil Service job evaluation exercise will produce results that can be implemented.”

I proceeded to offer a free presentation on various systems of job evaluations and how to select, apply, and implement the most appropriate ones. Credit to Ambassador Muthaura’s office, I received a response on January 3, 2005, which read:

“Thank you for your letter regarding the above subject matter. Delay in replying is regretted.

Kindly note that your proposal has been forwarded to Directorate of Personnel Management for consideration. They have separately been advised to get in touch with you regarding the presentation.”  

This response came after it had become quite clear that the job evaluation exercise, that was still in progress, was not going as well as had been expected. Unfortunately, I could not follow up on this as the letter reached me just a few days before I was due to travel out of the country for an extended stay, to organize my research in preparation for my doctoral dissertation defense.  

Again, in August 2010 I wrote to Ambassador Muthaura, this time in reference to the Akilano Akiwumi tribunal’s work on compensation and benefits for Members of Parliament and the employees of the National Assembly. Following are the contents of that letter:

Remuneration structuring and compensation administration in public and constitutional institutions can be done professionally and competently if specific steps are taken to ensure that the necessary skills are developed within the relevant government ministry or department. DPM might be just the right place to launch such a developmental programme, thus bringing professionalism into the elusive area of job evaluation and compensation structuring.

It is fair to note, for instance, that the Akilano Akiwumi tribunal lacked the benefit of professional input when reviewing the remuneration packages for Members of Parliament and the employees of the National Assembly. While acknowledging the importance of the task that lay before such a tribunal, (or as may come before a commission such as the one proposed for the future), it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the outcome of such an important exercise as remuneration structuring, might amount to nothing more than a ‘bandaging' response to a festering wound requiring a ‘surgical’ approach.

My recommendation when I appeared before the tribunal on April 3, 2009, was for the tribunal to take a long-term view and advise the government on the need to develop professional capability with the capacity to address issues of salaries administration and compensation structuring within the public and constitutional institutions.

The potential to build a cadre of professionals in this area, I noted, was high. And the Directorate of Personnel Management was one place to look for possible candidates.

My suggestion was similar to a proposal I had made earlier, in 2004, when a job evaluation exercise was underway for the Civil Service. My proposal then was to assist DPM in acquiring skills that would enable the government to monitor and evaluate the on-going exercise, so that its successful implementation might be realized.

I still do believe that the requisite capability can be developed within DPM, so that professional input is always readily available whenever the need to review remuneration structures arises, either in the public sector in general, or in constitutional institutions. Furthermore, it would help maintain, monitor and manage the installed remuneration structures. 

In conclusion I should add that, without the existence of a logical framework within which the administration of remuneration can be carried out, it will always remain a challenge to remove, or even minimize inequalities in a remuneration system, be it in the public or in the private sector of our economy.

Indeed, without professional input, a commission such as the one to be constituted may not have the tools to enable it to fairly, and adequately, address compensation issues in what is bound to be an increasingly complex work place with ever changing needs for new skill-sets.

I strongly believe that there is an urgent need for the government, in this case, the employer, in collaboration with the SRC, to consider building the necessary know-how in compensation structuring and job evaluation practices, as a high priority. Without the requisite internal know-how for the public sector, we can expect huge sums of the taxpayers' money to be squandered on projects that cannot be implemented. 

CBA - The just option for the public sector

It has been a real challenge for the public sector to wade through the murky waters of remunerations and benefits through CBAs. To complicate matters, the arbitration processes have been thrown into disarray by the entry of the SRC into the equation, with little to offer. Furthermore, the negotiations have been conducted largely without the input from industrial relations experts, or other experts in the trade.

The courts have also had their share of challenges, leaving the ordinary Kenyan a little confused. Three different court decisions, reported in the media recently, attest to this.

In the first case, where the challenge was on the constitutionality of Parliament in nullifying "certain gazette notices issued by the SRC, in respect of earnings by public servants", a three-judge bench ruled that the SRC had acted within the law, and Parliament needed to be "alive to the objects and authority of commissions and independent offices (as) provided by the law." 

In a second case, a high court Judge ruled that: "unions whose members worked in state corporations should know their members are public servants and the SRC was constitutionally empowered to regulate their salaries." This, notwithstanding the fact that the SRC was empowered by law to: “set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers", but, to "advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers.”

Yet, in a third case, on November 27, 2014, another high court judge made a ruling, that the SRC had "no powers to determine the salaries and benefits of parastatal workers." The Judge further observed that, "the SRC could not meddle in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that employees of state corporations have signed with their employers".

I stand to be corrected here, I don't believe that the teachers, doctors, professors and the lecturers in public institutions, all fall under the State Officers classification. But, as a job analyst, I will stick to what I am best qualified to comment on.

In the year 2012, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) invited consultants to submit expressions of interest (EOI) to conduct job evaluation exercises for two job classifications in the public sector. The exercise for the first job category, was to evaluate all the jobs classified as State Officers. The deadline for submitting expressions of interest for this category was June 4, 2012.

The other exercise, was for “all Public Offices (excluding State Offices) in the national and county governments.” And to “include all jobs in, but not limited to: Civil Service; Teaching Service; National Security organs; over two hundred State Corporations; the Judicial Service; the Kenya National Assembly; Kenya National Audit Office; Controller of Budget Office; Office of Director of Public Prosecution; Constitutional Commissions; Statutory Committees/Commissions/Tribunals and Public Universities.” The deadline for submitting expressions of interest for this category, was August 24, 2012.

 Something, unexplained, must have happened to the second exercise, because, two years later, in August 2014, the SRC sent out a fresh invitation for consultants to submit expression of interest to conduct a job evaluation exercise for public officers. This time the exercise was to “cover all jobs in public offices, both at the national and county governments including other public institutions within the public service.” But, this time, the SRC had “clustered the organizations into seven (7) broad clusters/sectors”

Unfortunately, by embarking on job evaluation exercises, which the SRC was to use as the baseline for setting compensation levels for the State and Public Offices, the Commission committed the first error of choosing the wrong platform for the job. The Commission should have instead, realized that setting pay levels, was a matter of economic considerations, the prevailing community pay levels, the employer’s fiscal policies, and the employer’s ability to implement and sustain a manageable compensation structure. Job evaluation exercises were designed for different purposes. The most important among them being to minimize or remove inequalities in a pay structure. This process would usually be initiated by the organization that elects to do it.

Even if we were to assume that a job evaluation exercise could be used to determine the basic pay in an organization - something it is not designed to do – there are some rudimentary rules that should be observed to ensure that such an exercise was meaningful. For instance, the affected organization, as the key stakeholder, should be fully prepared for participation in such an exercise. The preparation process would require:

1)     Internal briefings and forming a job evaluation team (job evaluation committee) under a qualified job analyst – often an external consultant

2)     Identifying the range of jobs to be included in the exercise

3)     Selecting an appropriate job evaluation method

4)     Training the job evaluation committee. The members of the committee should be drawn from across functions, and should comprise people who clearly understand the jobs in the organization.

5)     Collecting information about the jobs to be evaluated, analyzing the jobs and preparing jobs descriptions. The job descriptions so prepared provide the main source of information for the steps that follow in conducting the exercise.

Ignoring the above rules, will, invariably, lead to generating expensive reports that are of little value to the organization. I am afraid to say that, this is the state of affairs in which the public sector in Kenya, finds itself, right now.

It should be remembered that, right at the outset, the SRC was very concerned about the size of the wage bill for the public sector. On August 14, 2012, I sent an email to the Commission suggesting that, the wage bill in the public sector could be brought to manageable and sustainable levels within a span of five to eight years, if the right approach was adopted. I suggested the following as an appropriate approach:

                 i.          Examine the current distribution of remuneration packages (total wage bill) across the public sector, and in collaboration with Treasury and other stakeholders, determine levels at which the wage bill could be sustained. This should enable the Commission to determine whether a ‘living wage’ (as has been done in some countries) could be used as a basis for setting the minimum pay in the public sector. This would provide the Commission with the necessary baseline for calibrating the remuneration and benefits structure for the public sector.

               ii.          Get all the stakeholders on board, as policy guidelines on salaries were agreed on, in line with the assessed level of a sustainable wage bill. (This is the stage where the CBAs become crucial).

             iii.          Commission an exercise on jobs rationalization (the need and the purpose for every job), and a job audit exercise, where necessary, to ensure that the wage bill was for actual, existing, and necessary jobs- (i.e. remove ghost workers from the payroll, and eliminate unnecessary jobs).

             iv.          With the help of compensation/salary structuring experts, set initial minimum and maximum compensation/salary levels for each of the entities identified in the terms of reference (in the call for EOI).

               v.          Incorporate in the process, provisions for the forty-seven counties and deal with these after the counties are fully constituted, functioning, and rationalized.  

             vi.          Job evaluation exercises could then follow, as deemed necessary, for each entity in the public sector, in order to remove, or minimize disparities in the compensation structures.

It was going to be a costly error for the SRC to start setting compensation structures through job evaluation exercises. An offer to make a free presentation on compensation structuring and job evaluation practices was not taken.

To my mind, the SRC ‘s mandate was too pervasive to be ignored. There was an urgent need to ensure that issues of remuneration and benefits for the State and Public Officers were approached correctly, since any adverse impact would affect the entire public sector, and, at a very high cost. My thought was to approach Parliament with the idea of offering a one-day workshop for a select number of people. But, again, "one does not have to attend some workshop to understand some things!", was what I heard coming out of Parliament.  

Already, by the beginning of 2013, there were signs that all was not going well. The claim by the SRC that the salaries announced in a special issue of the Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, were based on a job evaluation exercise results, was inaccurate. I pointed out the same to the SRC giving the following reasons:

·       A job evaluation exercise must have full participation of all the stakeholders. Both the National Assembly and the County Governments were not constituted at the time when the exercise was supposed to have been conducted.

·       A job evaluation exercise cannot be carried out across different entities. It follows then that a job evaluation exercise could not have been carried out across the legislature, the judiciary and the executive offices under one system, as reflected in the published results.

·       The factor comparison method, supposedly used by the SRC, was never designed for managerial and executive jobs. It was designed for operative and factory jobs

·       The salary curves generated from salaries announced in the special issue of the Kenya Gazette Vol. CXV No. 33 of March 1, 2013, did not conform to results of a job evaluation. As a psychometric measurement, a graphical representation of a job evaluation results, should follow a geometric progression, according to Weber's law. 

In a one-way communication with SRC, I noted that:

Increasingly, organizations have become complex and workplaces difficult to compare or draw parallelisms between them. The complexity increases with the dissimilarities in different entities, particularly where the entities may have little in common in terms of strategies and operational objectives. It is, therefore, not possible to conduct one job evaluation exercise across such entities. Yet, this is what the SRC has attempted to do, and proposes, or intends to continue doing with the state institutions/corporations in Kenya, for purposes of remuneration and benefits structuring. 

Furthermore, state institutions/corporations in Kenya include those that are in business, education and research; others are in services that have high economic and social impacts; yet, there are others that are engaged in environmental management, and agricultural enterprises, all these, among many others, have each, their unique systems of operation. Classifying such an array of institutions in clusters for the purpose of making decisions on remuneration and benefits is untenable and indefensible.

Failure to follow the 'rules of the game', in setting remuneration and benefits for the public sector, could easily lead to disruptive actions in a demoralized public sector.

Finally, I am using the information, which appeared in the media recently, to drawn graphical representations of the remuneration structures for Parliament, the Judiciary, and for the Doctors. Among the three data sets selected, only the Doctors' remuneration structure shows both minimum and maximum pay for each job group.

I will make only passing comment on the other two that don't show complete story. And then attempt to analyze the remuneration structure for Doctors, to illustrate the points I have tried to make here.

The data source for the graphs – here below - is from the remuneration structures published on February 7, 2017, by The Standard. Although several of the data published had numerous errors, the three data sets will provide adequate illustration.

The first thing that is noticeable is that the percentage differences between successive grades are all erratic. The salary curves themselves are difficult to describe. For a job analyst, they simply appear CHAOTIC! There is no job evaluation system that can explain the graphs. My analysis will be focused on the compensation structures for the Doctors' jobs.

PARLIAMENT

JUDICIARY

Doctors:

As the salary curves for the doctors’ monthly income indicate, here below, something is seriously wrong. Even if one were to accept that a job evaluation exercise could be conducted for the purpose of setting pay levels in an organization – something it is not designed to do – still, it would be prudent to use acceptable systems, and rules. Otherwise it would be double tragedy to superimpose the results derived from a faulty system onto an already defective compensation structure. And this is precisely what the SRC has attempted to do in this case and for the whole of the public sector.

Now, when a job analyst is presented with the above information, the first assumption is that the information represents the current status of the organization under study. The curve for the minimum pay should provide the basis from which to investigate the fairness of the compensation structure.

 We can see that there are eight (8)  job groups for Doctors. The lowest earns KES 196,989.00, while the highest earns KES 472,060.00 per month. We know that disparities exist in the structure just by looking at the percentage differences in basic pay between successive grades. One way of removing the disparities in the pay structure would be to find the common ratio for a geometric series between the minimum pay, for job group L and the minimum pay for job group T. The equation for the geometric series in this case is:

         
    
   Where the last term in the equation is KES 472,060, and the first term (a) is KES 196,989, where r is the common ratio. By solving the equation for r, we get 1.13 as the common ratio for the geometric progression. The equation for this calculation is:

    We can now use this factor (1.13) to obtain the values lying between job group L and job group T, i.e. values between the first term and the last term of the series. The new set of values, and the resulting graph, represent a more equitable compensation structure. The final structure would depend on the acceptability of the current pay structure, or on an existing CBA, and/or a job evaluation exercise, if this is deemed to be necessary.

It is important to underline the importance of involving all the stakeholders in a job evaluation exercise, as would be the case for CBA. Failure to meet this condition removes the ownership of the process from the stakeholders.

           
Doctors

       

The salary curves would look different if the compensation structure was designed to incorporate pay for performance. In this case the salary curves would be three, with the middle curve representing, an acceptable, average performance level. This decision varies from organization to organization, and the organization's competences in managing performance for productivity rather than for punitive purposes.

In conclusion, it is important to note that, the public sector will have to built adequate internal capacity in compensation structuring and job evaluation methods, if the sector expects to succeed in the elusive area of job evaluations and compensation management.

For now, the SRC needs to get back on track and put its house in order. In the meantime, the public sector has few options open outside the CBAs, for getting just and fair compensation structures.

Footnote

Thankfully, the Doctors are out of jail. After all, “The law is an ass”.

There are still lessons to be learnt from Oliver Twist (1838), by Charles Dickens. "Mr. Bumble, the unhappy spouse of a domineering wife, is told in court that ‘…the law supposes that your wife acts under your direction." Mr. Bumble does not understand how the law can possibly hold him accountable for any crime committed by his wife. Yet, the law holds him responsible!  

"If the law supposes that,’ said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands, ‘the law is a ass - a idiot".

Indeed, who would have expected to see a stand-off between the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC)? Yet, the law permitted it. In this case, was, or, wasn't, the SRC overstepping its mandate in encroaching on matters that did not concern it? Nevertheless, the protagonists had to make their arguments in a court of law to get a ruling on whether the SRC could 'meddle' with the sitting allowances for the members of the JSC. Well, "the law is an ass". Whichever way the ruling, it must be obeyed! Again, wading through murky waters!

"Fair wage policies possible"

The Sunday Nation of October 26, 1997, carried an article, by Joseph Alex Gichuhi, titled: "Fair wage policies possible". This was a time when teachers in Kenya had gone on strike over pay. Mr. Gichuhi envisioned a time when there would be a single agency responsible for "determining whether the total wage bill (was) economically compatible with the other development needs, and striking a balance between the various Government services". 

When the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) was created by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, it was expected that the wage bill would soon be aligned with the country's "other development needs". There was hope that the compensation structures across the public sector would also be harmonized through a rational and fair process. Hitherto, the compensation structures for the public sector had been constructed haphazardly, often without form. Over the years, the total wage bill continued to rise unabated, while disparities in the compensation structures widened.

Logically, the process of aligning the public sector's wage bill with the country's "other development needs", should be a continuous one and not a onetime event. A critical success factor for this process is ownership. Undoubtedly, the ownership must belong to the key stakeholders, who should remain actively engaged year-in, year-out. The stakeholders remain responsible for managing and maintaining "a striking balance between the various Government services", and other competing needs.

The same can be said about the harmonization of the compensation structures across the public sector. The ownership of any harmonization process must belong to the stakeholders. Strategic and policy decisions will, of necessity, emerge during the process. These can be addressed only by the stakeholders.

 Indeed, in their wisdom, the authors of the Kenya Constitution, 2010, gave the SRC, as its primary mandate, the responsibility to: "set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers". Its role, in so far as all the other Public Officers goes, is advisory. (Perhaps 'advisory', as a concept, is as nebulous as the classification between the 'State', and the 'Public' Officers.)

We could probably draw lessons from the Civil Service Reform Programs (CSRP) of the 1980s and 1990s, for the sub-Saharan Africa. The purpose of the CSRP was to restructure the Civil Service and other public institutions, including Local Government Institutions, and government corporations. The goal was to lower expenditure on wages, raise productivity, and efficiency in services delivery, Governments were also encouraged to take austerity measures in order to control their budgets. It was expected that, these actions, coupled with good governance, would help stimulate economic growth in the region, leading to a reduction in extreme poverty.

Without exception, country after country embarked on job evaluation exercises as the main drivers for achieving these results. But, the job evaluation systems used were flawed, rendering all such exercises useless. In any case, the approach was totally incongruous with the stated objectives of the Civil Service Reform Programs. Invariably, all these efforts failed to produce the desired outcomes; eventually, prompting both Mr. Gordon Brown and Professor Jeffrey Sachs to question the wisdom that had gone into some of the prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF for reforms in the sub-Saharan Africa.

Unfortunately, the SRC has repeated exactly the same mistakes as those of the CSRP era of the 1980s/1990s. And definitely, there cannot be any consolation in the knowledge that, similar mistakes occurred in 2004/'05, when a job evaluation exercise for the Civil Service was conducted in Kenya. The results of the exercise could not be implemented! Similarly, didn't the Prime Minister's Office attempt a job evaluation exercise in 2011? But, sometimes our memories can be short!

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind, that the results of the exercises commissioned by the SRC, at colossal sums of money – against professional advice - cannot be implemented, since they are not implementable. Then, the important question remains: considering that the SRC can only rely on information deriving from flawed exercises, should the Commission be part of the ongoing CBA discussions? For me, this would seem to defy logic!